Lessons from Ukraine, the Trump Campaign, and the readiness of the US and its Allies
Photo Credit: The Guardian
By: Seth Cyr
As those who attended Penn last year would know, students found themselves in the midst of an incredibly competitive and polarizing election cycle. On Locust, then-freshmen such as myself were greeted by volunteers and activists seeking to register us to vote or campaigning on behalf of individual causes. While activists and campaigners from Planned Parenthood, the Harris Campaign, and Dave McCormick’s campaign held events here, I encountered little conversation about the war in Ukraine. It was only in the Presidential debate and the campaign speech clips, that I was able to see the respective platforms of Trump and Harris. From Trump’s perspective especially, I saw his various critiques of the broader entity of NATO.
Among some of the more outlandish claims made during his race, was that he could end the war in 24 hours, that he could end the war while he was president-elect, or his encouragement of Russian invasion against low-paying NATO members. Knowing the unpredictability of Trump, this begs the question as to why he would make such statements: was this simply an appeal to please his populist base, or was there a prompting issue that caused this? I was once again conflicted; while Trump is hugely popular in the state, I found myself shocked at these remarks. So, I dug deeper to understand these.
Firstly, we must realize that President Trump’s anger, critique, and threats to NATO are not a new pattern. During his first term in office, President Trump grew angry with our European allies regarding the lack of accountability with NATO obligatory defense spending, capped at 2% of GDP per member state. In the Summer of 2018, when he demanded NATO members increase their spending to 4%, only five of the then 29 member alliance had even met the 2% minimum. Instead, after the Cold War, many European economies began to downsize their respective military budgets for a host of reasons. Don’t worry though, by the end of 2018, that figure grew to six. While I certainly did, and still do, believe in the importance of NATO, it is hard for me to reconcile my feelings of unity with our allies if a military agreement couldn’t be equally upheld. If nations cannot make payments, then they should not agree to policies which they cannot afford or they lack the will to carry out.
As such, with only a fraction of nations meeting their requirements, Trump began to see NATO as an archaic alliance: good for the Cold War, bad for the new World. From 2018 to 2022, the number of nations meeting this 2% requirement never exceeded 10 members. It was only when the Russians began their invasion in 2022 that this changed. As horrific and tragic as the war in Ukraine has become, it has acted as the necessary catalyst for NATO defense spending. Of the now 32 members, 23 were predicted to pay the 2% minimum in 2024. Not only this, but NATO has jointly decided, especially with the support of the Trump administration, that it will raise its new collective defense spending to 5% of GDP per member state by 2035.
However, this new policy begs a multitude of questions. It is true that European rearmament and the development of military industries is necessary for the security of Europe. Following the end of the Cold War, gradual cuts in European defense spending greatly limited the capability of European defense and weapons industries, to the point where in a Ukrainian-level war, the ammunition supplies of nations like the UK and Germany could hypothetically be exhausted in mere days. Significant investment in European defense industries is necessary if Europe wishes to have the basic and intrinsic ability to defend itself, especially for continuing its extensive shipments of weapons to Ukraine. Not only this, but it could allow the US to relocate resources from Europe to other nations, if needed. In an era with rising economic and potential military tensions with nations like China, Venezuela, and Iran, this may prove to be extremely valuable.
While these are certainly ambitious goals, it remains to be seen if they are realistic. Considering that most nations before the war couldn’t offer the 2% of GDP needed beforehand, and considering the rising debts of nations like the US, France, Italy, and the UK, this seems to be a tall order. In addition, I found it contradictory for the Trump administration, who campaigned on the establishment of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) and cutting government waste, to align itself with this goal. Looking at this from a fiscal perspective, this would suggest increasing our current spending to $1.56T in 2035 to meet the 3.5% military spending, or $2.24T to meet its total 5% obligation. If the Trump administration seeks to minimize the deficit, which has contributed to the US’s $38T in national debt, then it will need to seek other routes of spending, which has been proven to be a monumental political challenge to say the least.
In an era of increasing threats to the economic power of the US, from BRICS to the waning US Dollar, we need to ask ourselves what conditions we want to live in 10 years from now. As current college students, we will no doubt be in the beginning stages of our careers, marriages, or parenthoods. Do we want to continue the perpetual system of government spending and debt, or do we want to position ourselves in a way in which our security is jeopardized to adversaries like China or Russia? Do we want to maintain the strength of our currency and keep foreign trust in the US Dollar, or do we spend vast amounts to guarantee military power and protection? Do we want our NATO allies to talk about a funding goal, only to fail yet again, or do we aggressively push for 5%? These are questions that only future goals and current actions can answer.
While I have become supportive of the Ukrainian cause, I cannot confuse my support for the Ukrainians with my loyalty to the US. We must seek platforms and policy that protects the United States, which means that we must ensure that our European allies are capable of self-defense. The war has shown that the industrial capabilities of nations both large and small are capable of producing weapons, especially drones, that will shape the ways in which future wars are fought. With the high casualties on both sides, the cost of future conflict is high, while potential gains are diminishing with new developments of weapons.
We must develop a strategy that best prevents war, which starts with addressing our current weaknesses. We cannot rise to a threat without being united first, and that sentiment goes not only to NATO membership, but to our own citizens. In the broader European sphere, recent incursions by suspected Russian drones and/or fighter jets have raised great alarms within nations like Poland, Romania, Estonia, Denmark, and Germany. While these are by no means a rarity, the repeated and ever-growing intensity of these are raising questions as to how far the U.S. and its European allies will go to ensure the safety of their eastern partners. Likewise, domestic political turmoil from the ICE raids to the government shutdown have divided public opinion. If we wish to stay united and strong, then we must work together in a way that ensures the welfare of our nation, whether it is in terms of ideology, military, or fiscal policy.
Seth Cyr is a sophomore in the College studying Political Science from Gillette, Wyoming. He is an opinion writer for the Penn Post. His email is scyr@sas.upenn.edu.
